The U.S.A. Needs to Rethink its KFR Policy
Sticking to its policy on Kidnapping for Ransom (KFR), the U.S. Government faces an unnerving dilemma: does saving an American life today offset risking to lose more in the future? Although this might sound like a cynical oversimplification, the answer of the U.S. Government is: no. In fact, the idea that ransoms enable criminal groups to fund their operations and in turn threaten the United States is what motivates the U.S. Government not to pay. The second argument that supports this policy is the belief that paying ransoms sparks a vicious circle where ransoms lead to more kidnappings. The U.S. Government needs to rethink its KFR policy because these arguments are not as solid as they seem.
The idea that refusing
to pay ransoms prevents American citizens from being kidnapped is a myth.
The fact that radical Islamist groups capture Americans even though they are
aware of the U.S.A.’s no-ransom policy demonstrates that the motivation of the
crime is political, not economic. Simply put, the prospect of not obtaining a
ransom is not a sufficient deterrent for radical Islamists. Moreover, kidnappings
often happen due to tactical and operational windows of opportunity that
terrorist groups identify and exploit, as opposed to the nationality of the
victim. Accordingly, data reveal no proof that a no-ransom policy decreases the
probability that citizens are captured. The 225 Americans kidnapped since 2001
account for a striking 20% of the total seized citizens from 32 different
Western countries, almost all of which pay ransoms. Moreover, we lack evidence
on the fact that American aid workers and journalists operating in high-risk
areas are more numerous than those coming from other countries in a
statistically significant way. This mitigates the risk of self-selection in the
interpretation of the abovementioned data.
Even worse, this
policy dooms the Government to wait for the worst outcome impotently. Of the 90
hostages from 32 Western countries killed since 2001, 41 were Americans. In
other words, due to the current policy, abducted Americans have about a 50% chance
to die at the hands of their persecutors. Asking whether the U.S.A. would be
less secure today due to the payment of those 41 ransoms is a vague
counterfactual, whereas it is almost statistically certain that paying the
ransoms would have saved 41 American lives.
The other reason
underpinning the current U.S. KFR policy is that ransoms contribute to the
funding of the terrorists’ operations. Although this is indisputably true, the
impact of ransoms on the finances of terrorist groups is overestimated. Since
ransoms are paid occasionally and not in a systematic way, they are not a strategic
source of revenue for most terrorist organizations. For example, ransoms
represent a very small share of ISIS’ total revenues, as the group has access
to large oil reserves and taxes the population and the commercial activities in
the territory under its control. Thus, it is unlikely that a ransom would
substantially upgrade the group’s operational capabilities.
The need for
re-adjusting the policy is even more evident if we consider that there are no other
valid alternatives to rescue American citizens that happen to be captured. Deploying
specialized military personnel to exfiltrate a hostage is rarely feasible due
to tactical constraints and information gaps. Moreover, even when viable, this
option implies enormous risks both for the military personnel and the hostage. Also,
relying on intermediaries to pay ransoms, the U.S. Government distances itself
from the terrorists but also undermines its credibility. In fact, it is
straightforward that the American administration would have to compensate its
intermediaries in some way, which equals paying the ransom indirectly and
eluding its policy with a trick.
Because of the
abovementioned reasons, the U.S. Government should adopt a more flexible KFR
policy. Indeed, a new policy should not favor the indiscriminate payment of all
ransoms. For example, the terrorist organization Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb derives the largest shares of its revenues from ransoms, thus paying
a ransom to it would contribute substantially to the group’s operations. However, American
society needs a law that does not exclude paying ransoms a priori and allows to implement the best response on a
case-by-case basis.
Wmenlauloji-Evansville Robert Alvey https://www.cellallure.com/profile/Como-Borrar-Registro-De-Internet-Download-EXCLUSIVE-Manager/profile
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